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While smoking remains the leading preventable cause of death in Australia, 
existing policy options, except for bans on smoking at public places, seem to have 
limited scope for expansion. Eight new smoking bans, introduced in six different 
Australian jurisdictions over 2003 and 2005, provide a basis for evaluation. The 
analysis extends a popular two-part model of smoking behaviour by GLM and 
correlated random effect models. Difference-in-differences estimation using 4 waves of 
the Household, Income, Labour Dynamics Australia Survey indicates that neither the 
probability nor the intensity of smoking was affected. The results are robust to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been no lack of epidemiological evidence on the adverse health 
consequences of smoking and several findings on the impact of passive smoking have 
come to public attention following the US Surgeon General’s Report in 1986. Although 
estimates differ across surveys, a recent ABS statistic (2006) indicates that in 2004-
2005, 26% of men and 23% of women among the Australian adult population did still 
smoke. The current prevalence level compares well internationally but as of 1998 
smoking is still responsible for 15% of all deaths in Australia (ABS, 2006), making it 
the leading preventable cause of death. In addition, after a decline to roughly one 
quarter of the post-WWII level by the mid-1990s, the smoking rate for men stabilised as 
it caught up with women’s, which has remained static for more than half a century.  
A recent trend analysis commissioned by the Department of Health and Aging 
(Social Research Centre, 2006) uses a series of comparable surveys and concludes that 
following a plateau around 20.40% from 1999 to 2002, the smoking prevalence among  
Australians aged above 17 resumed its downward trend and declined to 18.4% in 2005. 
Available regulatory information reveals that six different Australian states/territories 
introduced new bans on smoking at selected places between 2003 and 2005, providing 
policy variations across jurisdictions and over time. Real cigarette prices remained fairly 
stable during the same period and there was no other noticeable government 
intervention. 
  The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the new 
smoking bans on individual smoking behaviour in Australia, or more specifically an 
individual’s decision to smoke and a smoker’s decision of how much to consume. 
Given that all but two of the regulatory changes covered only public places, they 
provide an interesting basis for evaluation in two aspects. 
First, smoking restrictions at public venues, if found effective, may provide 
Australian governments with an important policy lever to pull. Under the current 
regulatory regime in Australia -with the second most expensive cigarette price in the 
world, indoor smoking bans at private worksites and almost a complete ban on 
advertising- traditional policy options seem to have a limited scope for expansion. 
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Public place smoking bans have much room to manoeuvre, as evidenced by 
Queensland’s extension of smoking bans to selected outdoor areas in 2005.   
Second, while the empirical literature provides convincing findings on the 
effectiveness of workplace smoking bans (Evans et al., 1999), evidence on public place 
bans remains ambiguous. US-based studies on the effects of clean air laws generally 
conclude that smoking restrictions at worksites and public venues discourage smoking 
as they employ an arbitrary regulation index which cannot disentangle the effects of the 
two types of restrictions. An available study of public place smoking bans in Australia 
reports very weak empirical evidence of their effectiveness (Buddelmeyer and Wilkins, 
2005) but it fails to consider the relative strictness of regulations across jurisdictions. 
This paper examines the effects of public place smoking bans using a 
differences-in-differences approach and a 4-year panel of Australian individuals from 
the Household, Income, Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) Survey. A conventional 
two-part model has been estimated along with its generalised linear model and 
correlated random effects model counterparts. The empirical results indicate that none 
of the regulatory changes had a statistically detectable impact on the probability and 
intensity of smoking, and even economically significant policy coefficients have been 
typically estimated too imprecisely to warrant much confidence in the point estimates.  
 
II. TOBACCO REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA 
 
TOBACCO REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA PRIOR TO 2002 
 
The US Surgeon General’s Report in 1964 officially recognised the causal links 
between smoking and its adverse effects on health, stimulating anti-smoking sentiment 
internationally. Starting off with mandatory warning labels on cigarette packs in 1972, 
the Australian government has crafted a regime of stringent tobacco regulations. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, the assaults on the informational front were stepped up by the 
establishment of a cessation advisory service in each state, a series of mass media 
campaigns and regulations on tobacco advertising. Most notably, The Commonwealth 
Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 phased out virtually all forms of tobacco 
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advertising by 1995. White et al. (2003) state that by 1991, 80% of Australians were 
covered by advertising bans, and Bardsley and Olekalns (1999) found that the effect of 
advertising on aggregate tobacco consumption came to nil after 1993.  
Taxation has also been an important pillar of tobacco regulation. Bardsley and 
Olekalans (1999) estimated that the real cigarette price rose by more than 175% over 
1962/63 to 1995/96, with various taxes accounting for 65% of cigarette prices at the 
time when their study was written. In a recent 30-country comparison, Australia is 
found to have the second highest real cigarette prices (Lal and Scolo, 2002).  
In the mid-1980s amid growing concerns over passive smoking, the federal 
government legislated on smoking bans at its workplaces and Australian airlines. 
Private businesses also responded to the increasing public demand for smoke-free 
environment and tightening occupational health regulations by adopting workplace 
smoking restrictions voluntarily or in compliance with law. While no nationwide tally is 
available, data from Victoria shows that the percentage of indoor workers covered by 
total smoking bans increased from 17 to 70% over 1988-1999 (VicHealthCentre for 
Tobacco Control, 2001). The trend toward smoke-free environments continued into the 
late 1990s, as a series of State and Territory legislations came into effect, extending 
smoking bans to enclosed public venues. By 2002, a majority of State and Territories 
placed formal restrictions on smoking in indoor public venues including restaurants and 
shops, although the details and relative strictness varied across jurisdictions. 
 
SMOKE-FREE LEGISLATIONS AND REGULATIONS AFTER 2002 
 
Table 1 outlines the new wave of smoke-free laws/regulations which came into 
effect after 2002 and prior to September 2005. In the absence of Australian government-
provided data summarising when relevant smoking bans became effective in each 
jurisdiction, the construction of the table greatly benefited from information compiled 
by ASH Australia (2005; 2007), Buddelmyer and Wilkins (2005), Drabsch (2005) and 
Lewis (2007). All information contained in the table was subsequently confirmed as 
being true and comprehensive by PhD Frontdesk at the Deparment of Health and 
Ageing. 
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It seems reasonable to view the regulatory changes jointly as a natural 
experiment. Available regulatory data shows that there was no other major government 
intervention during the relevant period. Insofar as media campaigns are concerned, 
QuitVictoria’s new TV commercials in 2003 and the Cancer Institute NSW’s campaigns 
to inform certain sub-groups in 2004 and 2005 are the more significant ones; both by 
common sense and on the basis of econometric studies (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999) 
these items are likely to have had only a negligible impact on smoking behaviour, if any. 
Since the policy changes were state governments’ responses to the Health Department’s 
National Tobacco Strategy that called for the need to reduce exposure to passive 
smoking, a correlation between regulatory intervention and smoke-related shocks to 
individuals in a particular state is highly unlikely. Given that regulatory information is 
not readily available, it is also difficult to imagine that individuals would have invested 
time in going through Hansard to check on an upcoming smoke-free legislation for the 
purpose of making an optimal prior adjustment to their smoking behaviour. 
In light of the pre-existing regulations sketched above, the effects of Northern 
Territory’s intervention in 2003 and South Australia’s in 2004 will be difficult to 
interpret. They may capture the impact of formalising workplace bans to the extent that 
occupational health laws alone had provided little incentive to impose smoking bans at 
worksites. Thus, their proximity to pure public ban effects will depend on the 
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Table 1: Timeline of newly imposed smoking bans, 2003-2005 
2003 
January & May 
Northern Territory introduces smoking bans in enclosed public venues including 




New South Wales implements Phase One of the voluntary ‘Share the Air’ agreement 
with the industry; smoking is prohibited at bar or service counters and a non-smoking 
area should be designated within one bar area. 
2004  
July 
New South Wales implements Phase Two of the Share the Air agreement; one full 
smoke-free bar is to be designated in multiple-bar venues and there is a similar 
provision for recreational and gaming areas. 
 
December 
South Australia tightens its existing ban, prohibiting smoking in all enclosed public 




Queensland prohibits smoking in several outdoor areas, including sport stadiums, 
patrolled beaches, and areas in proximity to residential buildings and playgrounds; 
smoking bans in enclosed venues were tightened, requiring two thirds of licensed 
premises to be smoke-free before October.  
 
Tasmania extends smoke-free areas to a nightclub or cabaret, a gaming area and 50% of 
outdoor dining areas.   
 
Western Australia bans smoking within a metre of a bar in clubs and hotels, and within 
five metres of the entrance of government buildings including courts and hospitals.  
 
January & July 
New South Wales implements a new legislation in January, mainly formalising the 
Share the Air agreement. From July onwards, smoking is to be permitted in only one bar 
or gaming area in each premise. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Individual-level cigarette consumption data is characterised by a mixed 
distribution of several zeros and some positive values.  A two-part model has been 
widely applied in the empirical literature to tackle this issue. In part one the probability 
of participating in smoking is modelled by a binary response model, and in part two the 
consumption of cigarettes conditional on having participated is linearly estimated. 
The earliest form of smoking ban introduced in the latter half of the 1980s 
targeted private worksites. Evans et al. (1999) provide arguably the most convincing 
evaluation of workplace bans to date. Using nationally representative individual-level 
data from the USA, they initially found that workplace bans were associated with 5.7 
percentage point decline in smoking participation and 2.5 fewer cigarettes smoked per 
day by continuing smokers. These findings were robust to using a 2SLS estimator to 
account for selection bias and could be successfully replicated by employing an 
alternative dataset. The effects were found to increase in work hours, confirming 
causality.  Based on a cross-section of Japanese workers from Kanto and Kansai, 
Morozumi and Ii (2006) found that total smoking prohibition was associated with 10 
percentage point decrease in the propensity to smoke and 4.11 fewer cigarettes 
consumed per day, while simple separation of smoking areas affected neither. In Greece, 
Raptou et al. (2005) report a much weaker result that total prohibition only affected the 
conditional demand.  
In response to findings on the negative health consequences of passive smoking, 
indoor smoke-free laws in the United States have grown at dramatic rates. Since the 
effects of smoke-free laws extend to wider segments of the population than current 
workers, a growing number of studies has analysed their impact on smoking behaviour. 
A key limitation of the current literature comes from the prevalent use of a ‘regulation 
index’ which does not permit a meaningful and natural interpretation of the policy 
impact and drawing distinction between workplace bans and public place bans. 
 Most of the studies initially intend to include dummy indicators for smoking 
bans at different venues and use cross sectional variations to estimate the impact of each. 
As a given state is likely to have different types of bans simultaneously, however, all 
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policy effects tend to be imprecisely estimated. A common practice is to replace the 
policy dummies by a regulation index similar in spirit to one used in Wasserman et al. 
(1991), which takes one of five possible values.  The highest score, 1, is assigned to 
states with workplace smoking restrictions and the second highest, 0.75, is given to 
those with the restriction at restaurants. The remaining positive scores, 0.5 and 0.25, are 
distributed according to the number of other types of restrictions in force and 0 is 
reserved for regulation-free states.  
In two-part model applications, an increase in the ‘index’ has been found to be 
significantly associated with a decline in the adults’ probability of smoking and 
conditional demand (Wasserman et. al., 1991) or only in the conditional demand 
(Tauras, 2006). Chaloupka and Wechsler (1997) and Czart et al. (2001) find that the 
index significantly affects the conditional demand by university students, but not the 
decision to smoke. However, Tauras and Chaloupka (1999), whose work stands out for 
being a fixed-effects analysis using a panel of young adults, has estimated the impact of 
the index with statistical precision in both parts. Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) directly address 
the concern that the effects of smoking bans on the decision to smoke may simply 
reflect the substitution of smokeless tobacco for cigarettes; while their analysis does not 
include the second part, they find that an increase in the index leads to a significant 
decline in both the probability of smoking and of ‘snuff’ use.  
In a micro-level rational addiction model application, Chaloupka (1992) 
employs a separate dummy for each positive index value and finds evidence against 
parametric restrictions inherent in the index. He reports that although each dummy is 
significant, 0.5 and 0.75 groups have the same and biggest impact on the demand while 
0.25 and 1.00 groups have smaller effects. (Note: his work ignores the mixed 
distribution of consumption to incorporate dynamics implied by a reduced form rational 
addiction equation.) 
  Economics databases return only a few articles on Australian tobacco 
consumption. Bardsley and Olekalns (1999) estimated that workplace bans produced a 
5% decline in aggregate tobacco consumption between the late 1980s and 1995.   
Buddelmeyer and Wilkins (2005) estimated the impact of smoke-free laws on the 
decision to smoke and the decision to quit, using a 3-year panel from the HILDA survey. 
In their trivariate probit model, a dichotomous intervention variable was found to exert 
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no significant effect on the initiation probability, and to increase the quitting rate 
marginally for only those aged 14-17 and above 60. Their study is limited by the fact 
that the same binary variable was used to encompass all changes even though each 
state’s intervention differed with respect to scope and restrictiveness and also that the 
impact on the conditional demand was left unexamined.  
 
IV. MODELLING FRAMEWORK 
 
BASIC EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
The empirical analysis follows the dominant approach in the anti-smoking 
policy evaluation literature, the two-part model (2PM). This approach assumes  the 
conditional independence of the decision of how much to consume once the 
participation decision has been made.  In the context of medical care expenditure, there 
has been an unsettled debate over the relative merits of the 2PM and a sample selection 
model which assumes bivariate normality of disturbances in the two decisions (Jones, 
2000, pp.285-289). As Mullahy (1998) states a more relevant question for policy 
inferences may be, given that the 2PM has been demonstrated to be useful in several 
contexts, how its coefficients should be interpreted in the presence of the 
retransformation problem to be discussed below.  
In part one, the decision to smoke is modelled by a probit model: 
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                   (1) 
 
where i and t are individual and time subscripts respectively, c is the level of cigarette 
consumption, X represents a vector of characteristics and includes 1, u is a standard-
normally distributed error term and Φ(.) is the standard-normal cumulative density.   
Part two models the demand for cigarettes conditional on being a current smoker. 
Log transformation provides a convenient way to mitigate heteroskedasticity, moderate 
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the impact of potential outliers, and impose non-negativity constraints on the predicted 
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where log(c) is the natural log of c and e is a random error term differing from u. (2) is 
estimated separately from (1), using an OLS regression of log(c) on X. 
For policy analysis, the parameter of primary interest is the impact of policy on 
the arithmetic mean, E(cit | Xit, cit>0). The often-neglected retransformation problem 
(Manning, 1998; Manning and Mullahy, 2001) arises because e has zero conditional 
mean in logarithmic, not arithmetic, units. In general,  
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even if E(e | X, c>0) = 0. To correct this bias, a non-parametric smearing estimator of 
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where p is the subscript for observations with c > 0, P is the number of such 
observations, and e is the OLS residual from estimating (2). Thus, the expected tobacco 
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If eit is heteroskedastic its geometric function is no longer constant across Xit. (3) 
and (4) imply that heteroskedasticity not only invalidates OLS standard errors but also 
biases the retransformed prediction, E(c | X, c > 0). The size of bias may be substantial 
if the error variance, and thus the smearing estimate, is large.   
ˆ
An alternative approach models and estimates the form of heteroskedasticity. 
Specifically, Manning and Mullahy (2001) propose a simple alternative for part two 
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which can be consistently estimated as a generalised linear model (GLM) with log-link 
using the quasi-likelihood approach. The GLM requires choosing a heteroskedastic 
variance function of the form: 
 
λ γ κ )] [exp( ) , | var(
'
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where κ > 0 and λ ≥ 0. An incorrectly specified variance leads to inefficiency, but not 
inconsistency. The authors use a modified Park test as a way to form the basis for 
choosing a suitable variance function: 
 
it it 1 0 it
2
it it v c 0 c c c + + = > − ) ˆ log( ) | ) ˆ log(( λ λ                 (7) 
 
where  is an initial GLM prediction of c it c ˆ it with any variance function and vit is a 
random error in the auxiliary linear regression. If  ≈ 1, (6) is re-estimated with the 
Poisson distribution.  ≈ 2 and  ≈ 3 suggest re-estimation with gamma and inverse 
Gaussian distributions, respectively. Simulations by Manning and Mullahy (2001) show 
that GLM estimates can be highly imprecise under certain data generating mechanisms. 
Accordingly (6) will be estimated as a complement, rather than substitute, to (2).     
1 ˆ λ
1 ˆ λ 1 ˆ λ
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    Another source of bias lies in the presence of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, reflecting past experiences or personality traits which may affect an 
individual’s perception of smoking and costs of addiction. Examples include past 
exposure to certain cultural values, the circle of friends and the self-assessed risk of 
smoking. These factors may be correlated with observed characteristics but can be 
reasonably assumed to be constant over a short span of time under this study. 
This issue can be addressed by the use of panel data. Specifically, assume that 




    a     e
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where υit and εit are random disturbances orthogonal to Xit and ai1 and ai2 are time-
invariant individual-specific effects possibly correlated with Xit. In addition, assume 
that individual heterogeneity is linearly related to observed characteristics as follows: 
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                 ( 9 )  
 
where  i X  is a vector of averages of any time-varying regressors except time dummies 
for each individual.  
Under (9), both parts can be consistently estimated as correlated random-effects 
models as follows: 
 
) ( ) , | Pr(
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' ' )) , , | E(log(        (10b) 
 
where X no longer includes 1. In other words, the source of bias and inconsistency in 
(9) is directly controlled for. Once again, both parts will be estimated separately. While 
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fixed-effects models are more flexible in allowing any arbitrary form of correlation, 




The policy variations across states and over time, coupled with the availability 
of an individual-level panel spanning the relevant period, provide situations favourable 
to the use of a natural experiment approach as follows: 
 
it i t it
it it it it X R y





               ( 1 1 )  
 
where y is a measure of smoking linear in parameters, R is the unobservable stringency 
index of anti-smoking policy in i’s state of residence, f’(R)<0, τ is the common 
temporal effect, ι is time-invariant individual heterogeneity, and μ is a temporary 
idiosyncratic zero-mean error.  
Abstracting from X and assuming that there are only two periods and two states, 
the expected changes in outcomes over time can be written as: 
 
θ δ τ τ + = − + − = = − + + + ] [ )] f( ) [f( ) | E( t 1 t it 1 it it 1 it R R 1 S y y      ( 1 2 a )  
θ τ τ = − = = − + + ] [ ) | E( t 1 t it 1 it 0 S y y         (12b) 
 
where S=1 for the state with a new smoking ban (ie an increase in R) and S=0 otherwise.  
A difference-in-differences (DID) estimator can be obtained by subtracting 
(12b) from (12a), thereby isolating δ = [f(Rit+1) - f(Rit)] < 0. This identification strategy 
depends critically on the assumptions that E(μit | S = 1) = E(μit | S = 0); that R will 
remain constant over time if not for the smoking ban;  and that [τt+1 - τt] will be constant 
across states. In light of the stability in the Australian smoking prevalence during years 
preceding 2002 and the available regulatory information outlined above, these 
identifying assumptions appear to be reasonable.        
In a linear context, δ can be estimated in a regression model: 
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where T=1 for period t+1, X includes 1 and other covariates to reduce the error variance 
and to control for changing individual characteristics over time. It is straightforward to 
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where Th=1 at and after period h and STk = Ssi·Th if state s introduced new smoking 
bans at h. As outlined in Table 1, six jurisdictions excluding Victoria and Australian 
Capital Territory introduced new smoking bans over 2003 - 2005 and New South 
Wales’ intervention had been phased in through three different years. Adding terms in 
{.} to (1) or (2) shows the DID approach assumes that the policy impact takes the form 
of a permanent shift in the intercept on the latent variable or log of consumption.  
One limitation of this evaluation method is that it cannot isolate the impact of a 
restriction at a particular venue because each treatment ST is a package of different 
types of smoking restrictions. As discussed previously, available regulatory data is not 
detailed enough to tabulate what type of ban is in force in which jurisdiction and even if 
such information is available, multicollinearity among restrictions will make it difficult 
to identify venue-specific effects. Subject to these limitations, the DID approach is 
preferable to arbitrary regulation indices used by US-based studies in terms of the 
ability to clarify what is being measured.  
 




The primary data for the empirical analysis comes from the Household, Income, 
Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) Survey General Release 5.1. The HILDA Survey 
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is a large indefinite panel of households across Australia starting from 2001. The 
Survey is conducted during September of each year. On top of the household-level 
questionnaire, the Survey administers the person questionnaire (PQ) to household 
members aged above 14, asking for their personal information. The PQ is supplemented 
by the self-completion questionnaire (SCQ) which covers more sensitive personal topics, 
including smoking behaviour.  
The analysis is based on waves 2 through 5, spanning 2002 through 2005. Of 
46,247 observations who responded to the PQ and SCQ, 511 observations had not 
identified their current smoking status. After deleting these, 45,736 observations were 
retained. The baseline analysis, which treats the data as pooled cross sections, uses 
44,654 observations with complete information. For the correlated random effect 
analysis, 28,634 observations which remained in the sample without inter-state 
migration during the relevant period are used. More information is provided below.  
State-specific price data, including tobacco price indices and deflators for 
nominal variables, come from the Consumer Price Index Standard Data Report: Capital 
City Index Numbers by Expenditure Class September Quarter (ABS, 2004; ABS, 2005), 
released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in late October each year. 
        
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
From wave 2 onwards, the SCQ asks whether respondents smoke cigarettes or 
other tobacco products. Possible responses include ‘never smoked’, ‘no longer smoke’, 
‘smoke daily’, ‘smoke at least weekly’ and ‘smoke less often than weekly’. The 
frequency of response types are reported in Table 2. SMOKE, which equals 1 for the 
last three categories and 0 otherwise, was created for part one. Using this variable may 
overstate the policy impact on tobacco use, to the extent that smokers switch to smoke-
less tobacco products.  
Self-reported smokers are also asked to state their weekly consumption of 
tobacco products, in terms of the number of cigarettes. In wave 1, smokers were asked 
to state their weekly expenditure on tobacco products instead. Given limited price and 
product information, the two measures cannot be reconciled and wave 1 is not used in 
the analysis. 
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Table 2: Smoking status of observations in the HILDA waves 2 – 5 
Smoking status No. of obs. Percent No. of obs. Percent
Never smoked 22,131 49.56% 14,173 49.50%
No longer smoke 12,109 27.12% 8,426 29.43%
Smoke daily 8,561 19.17% 4,970 17.36%
Smoke at least weekly (but not daily) 1,045 2.34% 588 2.05%
Smoke less often than weekly 808 1.81% 477 1.67%
Total 44,654 100.00% 28,634 100.00%
Estimation sample 1 Estimation sample 2
 
 
For part two, information on the quantity smoked is required. As Table 3 shows, 
227 out of 10,414 smokers failed or refused to provide appropriate information. Ideally, 
the 2PM requires information on consumption decisions of all participants. The 
observations are retained in the sample, as they still provide valuable information for 
part one. 55 smokers, 49 of whom smoked less than weekly, reported zero consumption. 
It seems more natural to view zeros as refusal to respond, rather than indicators of 
‘social’ smokers who do not smoke regularly, given the noise in the data to be discussed 
below. LN(QTTY) has been created by taking the natural log of the number of 
cigarettes smoked per week by current smokers who reported positive numbers. 
 
Table 3: The number of cigarettes smoked per week in the HILDA  
waves 2 – 5; self-reported response types for smokers  
Responses No. of obs. Percent
(a) No. of obs. Percent
(a)
Implausible value 1 0.01% 1 0.02%
Refused/not stated 212 2.09% 102 1.73%
Don't know 14 0.14% 5 0.08%
None 54 0.53% 29 0.49%
Mean positive weekly consumption 10133 82.25 5898 84.06
Total 10414 - 6035 -
(a) A percentage of self-reported smokers who made each inconsistent response or the mean 
number of cigarettes smoked by smokers who reported positive consumption
Estimation Sample 2 Estimation Sample 1
 
 
Overall, the data on the quantity smoked is less than ideal. As noted by 
Wasserman et al. (1991), a greater incentive for heavy smokers to underreport their 
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consumption may have implications for the consistency of estimators. The SCQ does 
not seem immune from underreporting as several daily smokers reported less 
consumption than less frequent smokers. In addition, the SCQ data fails to adjust for the 
potential substitution of cigarettes with heavier tobacco contents for lighter ones; the 
impact of policy intervention may be overestimated consequentially. These problems 
are common to most of surveys and the extent to which microeconometric findings are 
invalidated is unknown. 
 
POLICY VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION SAMPLES 
 
The HILDA dataset provides state (hhstate) and wave (wave) identifiers for each 
observation. State dummies were created using the former. The time dummy for 200n 
was set to unity if wave  ≥ n. Based on Table 1, policy variables were created by 
multiplying state dummies and relevant year dummies. South Australia’s intervention in 
2004 took effect in December and hence the South Australia dummy was interacted 
with the 2005 dummy instead. This is a somewhat rough definition, necessitated by the 
absence of information on when the SCQ was completed; while wave n interviews 
began in September of 200n, the data collection could have been delayed until next year. 
In principle the DID approach requires the same individuals be present in each 
group before and after an intervention, so that individual fixed effects can be cancelled 
out. Interstate migration is analogous to treatment status changes. Since this study 
covers 4 years and the HILDA panel is unbalanced, placing such requirements on the 
sample will lead to the loss of many observations. To maximise the sample size and 
check for selection bias, the baseline analysis treats the data as pooled cross sections of 
44,654 observations. In the evaluation literature, a DID estimator is often applied to 
independently pooled cross sections by assuming that the expected individual effect 
within each group remains constant even though sampled individuals change over time. 
This assumption is far less restrictive for this study since the dataset still includes a 
large number of individuals who provided interviews through relevant waves and did 
not move to other states. 
For a sensitivity check and random effects analysis, the estimation sample was 
restricted to 28,634 observations or 7,169 individuals who 1) remained in the sample 
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from wave 2 until relevant regulations took effect and 2) did not move across states. In 
effect, the new estimation sample is a balanced panel of individuals from all 
jurisdictions but Northern Territory; those from Northern Territory were retained so 




The ABS’s tobacco price index per state capital was matched with each 
observation, based on state and wave identifiers. It is based on the quality-adjusted retail 
price of one cigarette, where quality refers to the amount of tobacco content (Kidd and 
Hopkins, 2004). For this analysis, each state’s tobacco index was deflated by that state’s 
consumer price index and log-transformed to create LN(PRICE). The price data is far 
less detailed than those used in the US studies which provide within-state variations too. 
In addition the tobacco prices tended to vary minimally across states and, in real terms, 
over time as reported in Appendix 1. Given these features the difficulty of estimating 
the price impact with precision can be expected a priori.   
The HILDA survey provides a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics which 
can be used as control variables. Nominal family disposable loss (hifin) was subtracted 
from family income (hifip) to create a real family income variable (FAMINC), 
in ’0,000s of 2002 dollars, using state consumer price indices as deflators. The data on 
self-reported satisfaction with life (losat) was available on a 0-to-10 scale, where 5 
corresponds to indifference. Two dummy variables were created from this, indicating 
dissatisfaction with life or LFDIS = 1 if losa t < 4, and satisfaction with life or LFSAT 
= 1 if losa t > 6. Other characteristic variables are relatively generic and a specific 
discussion is omitted. All variable definitions and summary statistics are reported in 
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(a) Variables in the HILDA dataset on which the defined variables are based.
associations or clubs
at least once a week
other policy variables are defined similarly
=1 if resides in that state or territory; 
for example, WA=1 if the person lives in Western Australia
NT·Y3 or Nothern Territory's regulatory intervention in 2003; 
=1 if drinks
logged real tobacco price index for the person's state
Description
=1 if year ≥ 200N; eg Y4=1 if surveyed in 2004 or 2005
age as at 30 June each year
square of AGE
real family income in '0,000s of constant 2002 dollars
square of FAMINC
=1 if an active member of sporting/hobby/community-based 
=1 if socialises with friends or non-resident family members 
=1 if the highest qualification is year 11 or below
=1 if dissatisfied with life
=1 if satisfied with life
=1 if does physical exercise at least once a week
=1 if currently divorced or separated
=1 if currently widowed
=1 if holds higher qualifications than an undergraduate degree
=1 if holds an undergraduate degree
=1 if currently employed
=1 if cureently unemployed
=1 if works in the hospitality industry
=1 if currently married legally or de facto
=1 if smoke; =0 otherwise
(positive) number of cigarettes smoked per week by a smoker
natural log of QTTY
number of persons in the household
=1 if resides in a major urban area
=1 if resides in a rural area
=1 if male
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Table 5: Summary statistics 
 
Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SMOKE 0.233 0.423 0.000 1.000 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000
QTTY
(c) 82.248 71.580 1.000 1200.000 84.058 70.637 1.000 600.000
LN(QTTY)
(c) 3.863 1.286 0.000 7.090 3.887 1.299 0.000 6.397
FMSIZ 2.892 1.452 1.000 13.000 2.828 1.421 1.000 13.000
LN(PRICE) 5.892 0.041 5.791 5.952 5.892 0.042 5.791 5.952
AGE 43.744 17.717 15.000 93.000 45.899 16.605 15.000 93.000
FAMINC 5.596 4.229 -65.650 46.815 5.557 4.121 -65.650 46.815
Estimation Sample 1




(a)(d) Estimation Sample 2
(b)(d)
Name Mean Name Mean Name Mean Name Mean
MJURBAN 0.604 PHYACT 0.730 MJURBAN 0.602 PHYACT 0.735
RURAL 0.125 CLUB 0.399 RURAL 0.127 CLUB 0.412
MALE 0.470 SOCWK 0.305 MALE 0.460 SOCWK 0.283
INDIG 0.017 DRINK 0.834 INDIG 0.014 DRINK 0.847
EMP 0.639 Y3 0.749 EMP 0.646 Y3 0.750
UNEMP 0.034 Y4 0.494 UNEMP 0.025 Y4 0.500
HOSP 0.041 Y5 0.246 HOSP 0.037 Y5 0.250
MARRIED 0.633 NSW 0.297 MARRIED 0.681 NSW 0.290
DIVORCED 0.091 QLD 0.203 DIVORCED 0.096 QLD 0.207
WIDOWED 0.048 SA 0.095 WIDOWED 0.046 SA 0.094
PSTUGRD 0.077 WA 0.099 PSTUGRD 0.089 WA 0.099
UGRD 0.122 TAS 0.033 UGRD 0.131 TAS 0.036
YR11 0.372 NT 0.006 YR11 0.346 NT 0.006
LFDIS 0.014 ACT 0.020 LFDIS 0.012 ACT 0.021
LFSAT 0.872 LFSAT 0.882
(a) No. of observations = 44,654 ; No. of individuals = 15,007
(b) No. of observations = 28,634 ; No. of individuals = 7,169
(c) Summary statistics are calculated over observations with positive consumption in each estimation sample.
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VI. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
BASELINE CROSS SECTIONAL RESULTS 
 
Table 6 presents the baseline model and its GLM extension. Column (1) lists 
probit estimates for the participation equation. (2) reports OLS estimates for the 
conditional log demand equation; the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null of 
homosekdasticity at the 1% level and the smearing estimate has a size of 1.672. (3) 
reports the log of the expected conditional demand, as estimated by the GLM; since the 
modified Park test yields   = 1.3 regardless of initial variance functions, the Poisson 
distribution has been chosen. Suppressed coefficient estimates can be found in 
Appendix 2. As presented in Table 7, the baseline probit model correctly classifies 
72.44% of smokers and 61.41% of non-smokers using the 23-77 criterion that has been 
chosen to reflect the low sample mean of SMOKE.   
1 ˆ λ
Three key findings emerge from the analysis. First, the probit estimates confirm 
the previous finding by Buddelmeyer and Wilkins (2005) that the Australian smoking 
bans in 2003 had a statistically insignificant impact on the decision to smoke. The same 
is the case with additional smoking bans unique to this study, regardless of the relative 
levels of stringency. Second, as discussed previously, several US-based studies 
conclude that smoking bans affect the intensity of smoking even when they have no 
impact on the decision to smoke. The OLS and GLM estimates, however, indicate that 
the results cannot be generalised to Australia. Finally, the policy coefficient estimates 
tend to have practically negligible magnitudes and inconsistent signs across regressions. 
Contextual considerations do not lend support to the effectiveness of smoking bans 
either. New South Wales’ intervention in 2004 (NSW*Y4) was the second phase of an 
industrial agreement in 2003 (NSW*Y3) and the coefficients on the two variables need 
to be added up within each column to obtain the overall impact of this policy change. 
As a result, Western Australia’s legislation in 2005 (WA*Y5) is the only regulation 
which is found to have negative signs across all regressions. It was, however, the least 
extensive intervention under consideration, prohibiting smoking within a metre of bars 
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and five metres of government buildings. The remainder of this subsection elaborates on 
the results reported in Table 6.  
 








MALE 0.226***(0.014) 0.234***(0.026) 0.208***(0.0173)
HOSP 0.101***(0.033) -0.129**(0.054) -0.105***(0.0385)
AGE 0.047***(0.003) 0.065***(0.005) 0.052***(0.003)
AGESQ
(e) -0.001***(0.000) -0.001***(0.000) -0.001***(0.000)
FAMINC -0.020***(0.003) -0.013***(0.005) -0.005*(0.003)
FAMINCSQ
(f) 0.000***(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)
NSW 0.031(0.100) 0.170(0.176) 0.069(0.116)
QLD -0.001(0.043) 0.251***(0.078) 0.203***(0.051)
SA 0.043(0.030) 0.184***(0.051) 0.083**(0.035)
WA 0.047(0.208) 0.235(0.378) 0.056(0.247)
TAS 0.293(0.223) 0.319(0.402) 0.093(0.264)
NT 0.288(0.214) 0.539*(0.302) 0.136(0.216)
ACT -0.207*(0.115) 0.201(0.210) 0.136(0.141)
Y3 -0.040(0.034) -0.071(0.058) -0.060(0.041)
Y4 -0.023(0.043) -0.016(0.077) 0.021(0.049)
Y5 -0.010(0.048) -0.021(0.090) -0.037(0.059)
NT*Y3 -0.164(0.204) -0.165(0.284) 0.192(0.191)
NSW*Y3 0.020(0.052) 0.021(0.095) 0.044(0.062)
NSW*Y4 -0.006(0.047) -0.057(0.083) -0.083(0.056)
SA*Y5 -0.043(0.063) -0.046(0.112) 0.018(0.071)
QLD*Y5 0.002(0.047) -0.006(0.081) -0.008(0.055)
TAS*Y5 0.091(0.104) 0.043(0.166) 0.022(0.110)
WA*Y5 -0.017(0.096) -0.063(0.179) -0.063(0.117)
NSW*Y5 -0.009(0.051) -0.058(0.094) 0.016(0.064)
Constant -10.53(12.71) -4.156(23.06) 4.803(15.00)
Observations 44654 10133 10133
(a) Other coefficients can be found in Appendix 2. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels.
(b) Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on probit index. Pseudo-R
2 = 0.111, Log-likelihood = -21571.
(c) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on E(ln(QTTY)). R
2 = 0.103.
(d) Sandwich standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on ln(E(QTTY)). Log pseudo-likelihood = -297722.
(e) Actual entries are -0.00072(0.00003), -0.00062(0.00005) and -0.00051(0.00004) in (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
(f) Actual entries are 0.00030(0.00008), -0.00018(0.00016), and -0.00015(0.00009) in (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
Conditional demand
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Table 7: Prediction successes from Table 6 (1) using 23:77 criterion 
Predicted 1 0 Total 72.44%
1 7,544 13,212 20,756 61.41%
0 2,870 21,028 23,898 63.99%
Total 10,414 34,240 44,654
Actual
% of SMOKE correctly predicted
% of 1s correctly predicted
% of 0s correctly predicted
 
 
In all columns, the eight policy variables are insignificant at any conventional 
level, both individually and jointly, while the seven state dummies are jointly significant 
at the 1% level. Statistical insignificance is not likely to be a consequence of insufficient 
variations in the policy variables. Working in the hospitality sector (HOSP) has a 
statistically significant impact at the 1% level across columns, despite its low sample 
mean of 0.0408, and confirms public health experts’ concern that the hospitality 
workers are more likely to participate in smoking.  
To facilitate a discussion of practical significance, marginal effects of covariates 
on expected outcome variables have been calculated. Given the statistical imprecision, 
the cumbersome procedure of calculating the average of treatment effects across 
observations has been avoided. Instead, the policy effects and other selected marginal 
effects have been evaluated at the typical values of explanatory variables in the sample. 
A reference individual for this analysis is described as: a 44-year old married woman 
living in a major urban area in Victoria at 2002, in a family of three earning $56,000 per 
year, employed, satisfied with life, doing physical exercise, drinking, and facing the log 
real cigarette price of 5.892. For this reference individual, the marginal effects of the 
reported personal characteristics are reported in Table 8. The policy impact at the time 
of treatment is reported in Table 9. NT*Y3 and WA*Y5 have been chosen because they 
can be viewed as the more practically relevant cases, the former in terms of economic 
significance and the latter in terms of consistent signs.     
Table 8 indicates that initial theoretical concerns notwithstanding, inferences 
from log-linear and GLM estimates are similar. Indeed the conditional demand of the 
reference individual predicted by OLS and GLM estimates are 65.79 and 70.11 
cigarettes per week, respectively. This contrasts with Tauras (2005) whose comparative 
analysis shows a substantial retransformation bias in the US tobacco consumption data. 
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The economic significance of WA*Y5 is rather trivial. The impact of NT*Y3 on 
the participation and the conditional demand is considerable, even though its sign in the 
GLM equation is counterintuitive. Even after abstracting from statistical imprecision 
which does not warrant much confidence in the point estimates, the results must be 
interpreted with caution; NT*Y3 included the formalisation of workplace smoking bans, 
not only public place bans. Coincidently, NT*Y3’s point estimates in the first two 
columns are similar to what Evans et al. (1999) found in a study of US workplace 
smoking bans, -5.7 percentage point reduction in participation and 17.5 fewer cigarettes 
smoked per week. 
 





MALE 0.073 17.346 16.209
HOSP 0.031 -7.963 -6.988
FMINC -0.005 -0.998 -0.467
AGE -0.005 0.675 0.497
The base conditional demand is 65.793 for OLS and 70.106 for GLM.
Conditional Demand
(b)
(b) Changes in the predicted number of cigarettes smoked per week by a smoker.
(a) Changes in the predicted probability of smoking. The base probability = 0.226.
 





NT*Y3 -0.057 -19.206 15.427
WA*Y5 -0.006 -6.337 -4.459
(a) Changes in the predicted probability of smoking





CORRELATED RANDOM-EFFECTS RESULTS 
 
Table 10  reports estimates from correlated random-effects probit and GLS, 
where individual heterogeneity is assumed to be linearly related to the within-individual 
averages of time-varying regressors. Suppressed coefficients are reported in Appendix 5. 
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In brief, the use of alternative estimators does not alter the main conclusion that there is 
insufficient evidence to endorse the effectiveness of smoking bans.  
In both regressions the time-demeaned averages are jointly significant at the 1% 
level, rejecting the null of strict exogeneity. The correlated random-effects 2PM has 
been estimated over the restricted sample of individuals as described in 5.3. When the 
baseline 2PM was estimated over the same restricted sample, no qualitative change 
occurred and any difference to be discussed below is not a consequence of using a 
different sample.     
As previously, the eight policy variables are jointly insignificant at any level in 
both columns. All individual policy effects have been imprecisely estimated in the 
participation equation. Furthermore, no policy intervention has the expected sign, 
except for Queensland’s regulation in 2005 (QLD*Y5) which is practically negligible 
(Table 1 indicates that NSW*Y5 cannot be viewed independently from the previous two 
changes in the same state). The negative and economically significant coefficient on 
NT*Y3 from the pooled probit appears fragile. 
In the conditional demand equation, QLD*Y5 is statistically significant at the 
5% level and considerable in magnitude. It also has a negative sign as it does in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 6. While this policy intervention had a greater coverage 
than most others by imposing smoking bans at several selected outdoor areas 
overemphasis on its statistical significance is not warranted, given that the regression 
includes a larger number of variables than previously and no other policy coefficient is 
close to being even marginally significant. Other practically non-trivial interventions 
with expected signs include NT*Y3 and WA*Y5, same as in the pooled log-linear 
conditional demand.  
For the same reference individual as in 6.3 and each of the three interventions, 
the policy impact at the time of treatment has been calculated. The smearing estimate is 
1.933. The estimated effects of NT*Y3 and WA*Y5 are very similar to the pooled 
results: 17.0148 and 6.8264 fewer cigarettes smoked per week, respectively. The impact 
of QLD*Y5 is estimated to be 10.0534 fewer cigarettes smoked.  
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Table 10: Selected Correlated Random-Effects Analysis Results
(a)
Participation Conditional demand




































(d) 10 . 6 8 9
(a) Other coefficients can be found in Appendix 5. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels.
(b) Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients on probit index. Log-likelihood =-6809.
(c) Standard errors robust to individual clustering in parentheses. Coefficients on E(ln(QTTY)). Overall R
2 = 0.121.
(d) σc denotes model standard deviation due to individual heterogeneity, σe
 due to random error. 
(e) Actual entries are -0.00215(0.00029) in (1) and -0.00063(0.00012) in (2).
(f) Actual entries are -0.00010(0.00042) in (1) and -0.00028(0.00010) in (2).  
NT*Y3 QLD*Y5 WA*Y5
E(QTTY | QTTY>0) -17.015 -10.053 -6.826
Effects of smoking bans on conditional demand
(g)
(g) Changes in the number of cigarettes smoked per week by a smoker  
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
To ensure that the reported results are not sensitive to subjective choices made in 
empirical modelling, several alternative specifications, policy variable definitions and 
estimation samples have been explored. Some examples include:  
 
•  interacting each policy variable with 1) drinking, 2) hospitality employment, and 
3) weekly socialising indicators as individuals with these characteristics are 
more frequently or persistently exposed to public place bans. 
•  estimating the 2PM separately over males and females since women’s smoking 
rate has been more persistent historically. 
•  estimating the 2PM separately over different age groups. 
 
A more detailed description is available on request. In brief, none of the resulting 
changes affect the conclusion and it is illustrative to note that a drastic alternative 





This paper finds no overall evidence that the smoking bans affected either the 
decision to smoke or the demand for cigarettes by continuing smokers. A big majority 
of policy coefficients are found to be negligible, both statistically and practically. While 
Queensland’s smoke-free law in 2005 has a significant effect on the conditional demand 
in the random-effects regression, the result is not robust to alternative estimation 
methods. In both cross sectional and panel regressions, Western Australia’s regulation 
in 2005 and Northern Territory’s intervention in 2003 are found to have induced 
continuing smokers to smoke 4~7 and 16~19 fewer cigarettes per week; yet the level of 
statistical imprecision is too high to warrant any confidence in the point estimates 
because p-values associated with the two policy variables are well above 0.500. The 
results from alternative model specifications and sub-sample analysis indicate that no 
  27   
particular population sub-group responded to the new smoking bans. Recall that, if 
anything, using the HILDA or any standard survey data on smoking overestimates 
policy effects in the presence of substitution between ‘smoky’ and ‘smokeless’ tobacco 
and between heavier and lighter cigarettes. 
To reconcile these findings with results from the United States, it may be useful 
to consider an underlying policy mechanism. Smoking bans are believed to affect 
individual smoking behaviour by limiting opportunities to smoke directly and/or 
changing social norms regarding smoking (Levy and Friend, 2003). Since the direct 
effects of public place bans are likely to be minimal as people spend only so much time 
at affected areas, the current analysis can be interpreted as evidence against the latter 
possibility. Given the definition of the ‘regulation index’, the variable may have been 
found statistically significant in several US-based studies entirely because of the effects 
of worksite bans to which employed individuals are exposed for long duration each day. 
Yet, a study by Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) finds that the index also has a negative effect on 
the decision to consume smokeless tobacco which is not directly subject to smoking 
bans.  
It is therefore worth reconsidering Chaloupka’s (1992) speculation that ‘one 
unmeasured factor which may be being captured by the law indicators is publicity on 
the negative health consequences of cigarette smoking which accompanies the passage 
of a clean indoor air law’. In simple, the introduction of smoking bans affects people’s 
risk perception, rather than social norms. As a natural alternative to the ‘regulation 
index’, he defined a group dummy for each possible index point. He found that 
coefficient sizes were not proportional to regulatory stringency, though all dummies 
were statistically significant. Coincidently, most of existing US-based studies cover 
years from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, when the risks of passive smoking and 
smoke-related lawsuits were coming to public awareness for the first time. During the 
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VIII. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: ABS price indices per state capital 2002-2005 
Year NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT
Weighted 
Average of 8 
Capital Cities
2002 347.50 362.00 370.20 362.00 327.40 328.10 341.90 346.70 354.00
2003 363.60 376.10 382.20 382.50 343.80 339.20 357.60 362.40 369.50
2004 376.40 391.70 399.40 394.70 352.60 355.40 376.20 375.60 383.10
2005 395.60 408.70 417.00 411.10 362.10 364.10 390.20 388.00 399.60
Tobacco Price Index per State Capital as at September of each year
 
Year NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT
Weighted 
Average of 8 
Capital Cities
2002 139.60 137.80 139.20 140.30 135.80 137.50 135.40 138.10 138.50
2003 142.40 141.80 143.30 145.40 138.60 141.10 137.80 141.90 142.10
2004 146.20 144.20 146.80 149.00 142.00 145.00 140.80 145.50 145.40
2005 150.50 148.60 150.90 153.40 147.80 150.10 144.70 149.70 149.80
Consumer Price Index per State Capital as at September of each year
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FMSIZ -0.066***(0.006) -0.010(0.010) -0.008(0.007)
MJURBAN -0.098***(0.016) -0.197***(0.028) -0.110***(0.019)
RURAL -0.124***(0.024) -0.136***(0.041) -0.076***(0.028)
INDG 0.471***(0.048) 0.063(0.062) 0.058(0.060)
EMP -0.064***(0.019) -0.025(0.032) -0.029(0.022)
UNEMP 0.280***(0.038) 0.082(0.053) 0.039(0.040)
MARRIED -0.020(0.022) 0.049(0.035) 0.024(0.025)
DIVORCED 0.330***(0.030) 0.030(0.045) 0.048(0.031)
WIDOWED 0.215***(0.047) 0.135(0.088) 0.096*(0.056)
PSTUGRD -0.544*(0.032) -0.612***(0.082) -0.410***(0.053)
UGRD -0.376***(0.024) -0.438***(0.056) -0.243***(0.036)
YR11 0.155***(0.016) 0.183***(0.026) 0.097***(0.018)
LFDIS 0.158***(0.057) 0.054(0.080) 0.092*(0.051)
LFSAT -0.272***(0.021) -0.166***(0.032) -0.108***(0.022)
PHYACT -0.158***(0.016) -0.180***(0.027) -0.137***(0.018)
CLUB -0.204***(0.015) -0.133***(0.028) -0.054***(0.018)
SOCWK 0.118***(0.016) 0.113***(0.028) 0.064***(0.019)
DRINK 0.422***(0.021) -0.056(0.036) -0.002(0.027)
LN(PRICE) 1.632(2.157) 1.164(3.914) -0.242(2.546)
Observations 44654 10133 10133
(c) Continued from column (3) of Table 6 : Selected cross sectional analysis results
Conditional demand
(a) Continued from column (1) of Table 6 : Selected cross sectional analysis results
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Appendix 3: Additional Correlated Random-Effects Analysis Results
(a) 
Participation Conditional demand

























(a) Coefficients on time-demeaned averages have been suppressed and are available on request.
(b) Continued from column (1) of Table 10: Selected Correlated Random-Effects Analysis Results
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